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Somerville College, University of Oxford
Block’s well-known distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access con-
sciousness has generated a large philosophical literature about putative conceptual
connections between the two. The scientiﬁc literature about whether they come
apart in any actual cases is rather smaller. Empirical evidence gathered to date has
not settled the issue. Some put this down to a fundamental methodological obsta-
cle to the empirical study of the relation between phenomenal consciousness and
access consciousness. Block (2007) has drawn attention to the methodological puz-
zle and attempted to answer it. While the evidence Block points to is relevant and
important, this paper puts forward a more systematic framework for addressing
the puzzle. To give it a label, the approach is to study phenomenal consciousness
as a natural kind. The approach allows consciousness studies to move beyond
initial means of identifying instances of the kind like verbal report, and to ﬁnd its
underlying nature. It is well-recognised that facts about an underlying kind may
allow identiﬁcation of instances of the kind that do not match the initial means of
identiﬁcation (cp. non-liquid samples of water). This paper shows that the same
method can be deployed to investigate phenomenal consciousness independently of
access consciousness.
1. Introduction: a Distinctive Methodological Problem
Block’s important distinction between phenomenal consciousness (P)
and access consciousness (A) (Block 1995, 2001) has generated a large
literature about the ‘hard’ problem, necessary connections and explana-
tory gaps. More recently it has been suggested that there is a separate,
methodological problem: even if physicalism is unproblematically true,
scientiﬁc methods will be unable to differentiate P-consciousness from
A-consciousness empirically. It is argued that even if there really are
cases of P without A, or the converse, science will never be able to
discover them.
Re-use of this article is permitted in accordance with the Terms and Conditions set out at
http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/onlineopen
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The problem can be sketched as follows. The scientiﬁc study of
P-consciousness has to start with some cases of P to form an object of
study, together with some instances of P by which to identify what is
distinctive about the P cases. The thought is that these initial instances
will all be cases where conscious contents are also access conscious, so
all the cases of P will also be cases of A, and P of A. The claim is
that this presents a methodological challenge: that if there are cases of
P without A (or the converse), we could never discover them.
The methodological challenge has been given prominence by Block’s
recent attempt to answer it (Block 2007). It is not just a philosophers’
curiosity. It’s force is felt by many working scientists, leading some to
express humility about their power to investigate phenomenal con-
sciousness. Typically, they take themselves instead to be capable only
of studying the mechanisms of global accessibility of information:
‘[we] aim at characterising the crucial differences between those
aspects of neural activity that can be reported by a subject, and
those that cannot. … conscious access is one of the few empiri-
cally tractable problems presently accessible to an authentic sci-
entiﬁc investigation.’ (Dehaene & Changeux 2004, p. 1146)
In the light of the impact of this thought on actual scientiﬁc practice,
and of the sceptical responses to Block’s treatment,1 there is a pressing
need for a methodological approach that is capable of separating P
from A empirically. That is the goal of this paper. To give it a label,
the approach is to study phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind
(the ‘phenomenal kind’). The result will not be a positive case for the
existence of P without A or A without P, or for their always being
co-instantiated, but the prescription of a systematic way of gathering
evidence to answer the question.
Some versions of the problem deﬁne A-consciousness in a way that
rules out studying it as a natural kind. Section 2 argues that the enquiry
should not be foreclosed in this way and goes on to pinpoint a conception
of the A property that does generate a genuine empirical question for
which a methodological issue can arise. Section 3 identiﬁes a beguiling
thought, the initial plausibility of which underpins much of the intuitive
force of the methodological challenge. That thought is a bad one if phe-
nomenal properties could be natural kind properties. The real methodo-
logical challenge is identiﬁed in Section 4. It arises because we are
antecedently uncertain whether cognitive access is constitutively con-
nected to phenomenality. Section 5 sets out a framework equal to that
1 See the commentaries on Block (2007).
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challenge and explains how the natural kind methodology will generate
evidence that is likely to resolve it. If the framework produces evidence
that there is only one underlying natural kind, we can conclude that P
and A are always co-instantiated. If two underlying natural kinds are
uncovered, that is some evidence that P and A come apart, but the pic-
ture is more complicated. Section 6 identiﬁes some further steps that
could then be taken to bolster the evidence for P without A.
2. A formulation of A-Consciousness that Generates a Genuine
Empirical Question
2.1 Pp
To assess the prospects for distinguishing P from A empirically, we
need to be clearer about which properties we are picking out. In the
course of section 2 we set aside some ways of formulating the A prop-
erty that fail to generate an empirical question about which there could
be a methodological challenge and thereby arrive at a way of under-
standing A that makes distinguishing between P and A a genuinely
empirical problem.
We start in this subsection with the property of being phenome-
nally conscious. If there is such a property, it is shared by all the
mental episodes which have a ‘what it’s likeness’ to them. Each such
episode also has its own phenomenal character, a determinate way of
being phenomenally conscious. The methodological issue arises in the
same way for both the determinates and for the putative determin-
able property P. Since it is possible to doubt the existence of the
determinable while accepting the determinates (Shea & Bayne 2010,
p. 476) we deal with the latter, for example the phenomenal property
a person instantiates when she is phenomenally conscious of a red
cube against a white background. We adopt the usual practice of
using contents or schematic letters for contents to pick out pheno-
menal properties, without presupposing representationalism or con-
ceptualism about the phenomenal character of experience. We use Pp
for the property of being phenomenally conscious that p. To focus
on the methodological issues, we are assuming physicalism: Pp is
some physical property (intrinsic, extrinsic or functional) of the sub-
ject of the experience.
The science of consciousness must start with some instances of the
phenomenon. Four sources of evidence are relatively uncontroversial.
They are defeasible in certain cases. As the enquiry proceeds we will
learn more about why each is a source of evidence about Pp, which
may lead us to revise the probative value we attach to them, perhaps
METHODOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS WITH THE PHENOMENAL KIND 309
radically. But they are adequate to identify instances of the phenome-
non for further investigation.
The ﬁrst is obvious: S’s verbal report that p (based on her seeing,
hearing, feeling, etc., that p).2 We also take S’s negative verbal reports
(‘there was no red cube’) as evidence that S was not phenomenally con-
scious that p. Second, many experiments rely on S’s use of the informa-
tion that p to make a voluntary perceptual discrimination, which is
then reported by a non-verbal action like a button press. These are
‘reports’ in some extended sense, since subjects are given and agree
to verbal instructions about what to do, and are also typically asked
afterwards (often informally) to check that they were making their
discriminations in a standard, conscious manner (unlike priming, say).
Third, we infer that S is phenomenally conscious that p when S uses
the information that p to plan and carry out other voluntary actions.
Finally, we infer that S was phenomenally conscious that p when
presented with a stimulus if, on a subsequent occasion, she can
consciously remember the stimulus (which in turn is evidenced by one
of the foregoing tests).
These categories are not exclusive, e.g. verbal report is a form of
voluntary action. The second and third types of evidence give us some
initial traction on consciousness in cases where verbal report is unavail-
able (e.g. aphasia) or impossible (e.g. infants and other animals). Some
theorists may want to enlarge upon these initial lines of evidence.
Others would restrict them. Neither move undermines the structure of
what follows.
2.2 A Priori Connections
In this subsection we will reject two formulations of the A property
which presuppose that phenomenal consciousness cannot be studied as
a natural property.
The initial lines of evidence all involve the subject’s having some
kind of personal-level access to the content p. Some claim that there is
an a priori necessary connection between phenomenality and these
forms of cognitive access. For example, Chalmers argues that the study
2 Experiments tend to rely on verbal reports with object-level contents (e.g. ‘There is
now a red cube in front of me’) rather than so-called ‘‘subjective’’ reports with
meta-level contents (e.g. ‘I see that there is a red cube’). In philosophical contexts, it
is more common to rely on meta-level reports, because then the content of the ver-
bal report is the same as the property we ascribe to S in reliance on her verbal
report: that S has the phenomenal property, PRC, of being phenomenally conscious
of a red cube; i.e. PRC(S). In ordinary talk, people move seamlessly between the two
types of report. For our purposes, both kinds of report are evidence of the subject’s
phenomenal state.
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of consciousness depends on there being ‘epistemic levers’, which are
established a priori, by which instances of phenomenal consciousness
can be identiﬁed (Chalmers 1996). One is that A ﬁ P, as a matter of
epistemic necessity (pp. 218–22, 233–46).
If that were all we knew about P, then we would indeed have
no way of knowing whether non-A cases were P or not. However,
Chalmers thinks that we can also rely on an a priori bridge principle in
the other direction: P ﬁ A. These bridge principles only express
epistemic necessities, so they are consistent with the metaphysical possi-
bility of P without A (Chalmers 1996, pp. 221–2, 242–6, Chalmers
1998, pp. 6). However, if we do indeed know a priori that these ‘episte-
mic levers’ express epistemic necessities, then it is built-in that no
knowledge of cases of P without A is possible.
Chalmers has his own reasons for embracing these a priori bridge
principles. However, in order to focus on the claim that there is a
speciﬁcally methodological problem, we should not presuppose at the
outset that there is some A property such that it is impossible to know
about cases of P that are not also cases of A. If Pp is a natural prop-
erty then its character may differ from or go beyond the ways in which
we are inclined to judge its presence. It is a familiar point that natural
properties are normally veriﬁcation-transcendent. Even if our initial
means of identifying water rely on its being a transparent odourless
potable liquid, we can go on to identify instances of that natural prop-
erty which do not match our initial means of identiﬁcation (e.g. frozen
H2O).
So that we don’t rule out the start of the enquiry the possibility that
Pp is a natural property, we should take the initial lines of evidence
listed above simply to be defeasible ways of identifying instances of Pp.
They can act as ‘epistemic levers’ that get the inquiry going without
assuming any necessary connections (epistemic, nomological or meta-
physical) between A and P. If we are to investigate Pp in a way that
remains open to both outcomes — that there are necessary connections
between access and phenomenality, and that there are not — we cannot
build in a priori necessary connections at the outset, whether metaphys-
ical or epistemic.
Chalmers’ position is rather more subtle, because he allows that
our understanding of cognitive accessibility may be revised. The bi-
directional bridge principles connecting accessibility and phenomenality
only remain in place because A is revised so as to be the best func-
tional correlate of P. If that is how accessibility is thought of, then it is
again guaranteed that if there are cases of phenomenality without
accessibility, we cannot know about them. There can be no cases where
we are epistemically justiﬁed in thinking there is P without A or A
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without P because, by construction, in such cases we would revise our
conception of A to make the two terms co-extensional. That way of
proceeding would still leave open the interesting issue of whether
phenomenality is identical to the functional property A, or to the
categorical basis of A (Papineau 2007, ch. 7). But it still suffers from
the problem of ruling out at the outset the possibility that Pp is a
veriﬁcation-transcendent natural property.
In short, if there are these kinds of a priori necessary connections
between phenomenality and accessibility (either with our initial lines of
evidence or some polished-up conception of accessibility), then there is
no genuine empirical question about whether they come apart in actual
cases, about which a distinctively methodological problem could arise.
The methodological challenge only comes into view when we leave the
possibility open, at the outset of the enquiry, that initial lines of
evidence (verbal report, etc.) are defeasible ways of identifying a
veriﬁcation-transcendent natural property Pp.
2.3 Ap
Distinguishing between a natural property and ways of identifying it
does not put an end to the matter. Cognitive access generates a special
problem. A is not just a motley collection of every kind of correlational
evidence about phenomenality. It is supposed to be some kind of infor-
mation-processing property that is capable, itself, of accounting for
those lines of evidence (the capacity to give a verbal report that p,
etc.).
The fact that each of the four lines of evidence we started with is
taken independently to be evidence of the presence of the very same
property, Pp, suggests that they should converge. As indeed we ﬁnd. If
a subject is identiﬁed as phenomenally conscious that p according to
one of the lines of evidence, she tends to satisfy the others. If S verbally
reports that p on the basis of perception, she would also use the
information that p to plan and carry out voluntary actions, and so on.
We have already noted that there are cases in which these lines of evi-
dence diverge; for example in aphasics the evidence from verbal report
will not converge with the other three lines of evidence. Nevertheless,
the lines of evidence do agree with one another across a wide range of
ordinary cases.
But here’s the worry. Convergence raises the possibility of there
being an information-processing mechanism which is responsible for
that convergence. Notice that convergence occurs when the information
that p is available for directing a wide range of S’s behaviours.
It excludes cases where S’s sensitivity to the information that p is
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encapsulated within a particular mode of behaviour. So convergence
immediately raises the prospect of there being some mechanism that
makes the information that p available for directing a wide range of
S’s behaviours — a mechanism of global availability of information.
Some refer to such a mechanism as a global workspace (Dehaene &
Naccache 2001). Information in the global workspace can be used by a
range of consumer systems: language production, action planning, deci-
sion-making, episodic memory, etc.
Having a mechanism to make information globally available for
directing a wide range of her behaviour (having a global workspace) is
a putative property of the subject S. The mechanism will operate on
different contents on different occasions. When the mechanism makes
the information that p globally available for use in directing a range of
behaviours, S has property Ap:
S instantiates property Ap = df
(i) S has a mechanism M for making information directly3 avail-
able for use in directing a wide range of behaviours; and
(ii) M is making the information that p directly available for
directing a wide range of potential behaviours of S.
S’s instantiating Ap would explain why she makes a verbal report that
p, why she makes a voluntary perceptual discrimination based on p,
why she uses the information that p to plan and carry out voluntary
actions and why she can store the information that p in memory.
Furthermore, instantiating Ap would also explain convergence — when
she evinces one of these signs, she tends to display the others too. If
access conscious contents are deﬁned as those that are poised for ‘free
use in reasoning and for direct ‘‘rational’’ control of action and speech’
(Block 1997, p. 382), a subject who instantiates Ap is thereby access
conscious that p.
Ap is a contrary of informational encapsulation. In some cases, sensi-
tivity to the information that p is exhibited in one, but only one, type of
behaviour performed by a subject (e.g. the ﬁne-grained information
about object location encoded in the dorsal stream and used for online
3 It is not straightforward to specify what it is for information to be ‘directly’
available. Roughly, the idea is that no further information-processing is required for
it to be used by a consuming system (a formulation that is open to precisiﬁcation
in the light of unfolding data about the nature of the relevant psychological
mechanisms).
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action guidance). Informational encapsulation explains why information
is used by only one consumer system. In contrast, when S instantiates
Ap the information that p is not encapsulated.
4 Sensitivity to the infor-
mation can be evinced in any type of behaviour, provided the
consuming mechanisms giving rise to that behaviour are not otherwise
disabled.
How does Ap generate a methodological challenge? Its potentially
close evidential connection to Pp is a start. The four lines of evidence
that we were taking to be initial evidence of the presence or absence
of Pp are also very directly evidence of the presence or absence of
Ap, if there is such a property (and the converge of those lines of
evidence is some evidence that there is). So the discovery of a mecha-
nism Ap would immediately raise the question of its relation to Pp:
identity, necessary co-instantiation, the existence of Pp without Ap,
and so on.
It is worth emphasising that our Ap is rather different from the
conceptions of access consciousness in the previous subsection which
create an a priori bar to knowledge of phenomenality without
access. Our Ap is a theoretical posit. It is not identical to the com-
monsense idea that some information is ‘accessible’ to the whole per-
son, at the personal level. Ap is a property whose presence we will
infer from the initial lines of evidence, supplemented by subsequent
discoveries. The simplest way in which it could turn out that there
is phenomenality without access in our sense is if we discover that
there is no information processing property Ap. Nevertheless, it is
plausible that there is some common information processing mecha-
nism that is responsible for the initial lines of evidence and their
convergence. If so we want to know if it in fact dissociates from Pp
and, if it does, how to differentiate empirically between instances of
it and instances of Pp.
2.4 The Empirical Question
We’ve seen that conceptions of phenomenal properties that tie them a
priori to a set of criteria by which they are identiﬁed makes it impossi-
ble to distinguish them empirically from access properties. But a genu-
ine empirical question does arise about the relation between Pp and a
putative information-processing property Ap that is responsible for the
4 Not all unencapsulated information gives rise to instantiation of a corresponding Ap
property. If there are ‘central systems’ that solve the frame problem, then relevance-
driven searches somehow cover our whole stock of beliefs without each of those
beliefs thereby being available to a wide range of consuming systems.
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initial lines of evidence of Pp. On the one hand, is Ap just a characteri-
sation of the underlying phenomenal property we were interested in, Pp
or, if they’re not identical, is there some tight connection (at least
nomological) such that they always go together in actual cases? On the
other hand, are they separately instantiated in actual cases and, if so,
how should we go about identifying such cases (cases of Pp without Ap
or the converse)? Whether option one or option two obtains looks like
it should be a straightforwardly empirical question.
There are several possibilities within each option. Option one encom-
passes the possibility that Pp is the realiser of Ap, that they are co-
instantiated as a matter of metaphysical necessity, and that they are
identical. Option one also encompasses the possibility that nomological
facts about how things are constituted — about how properties of
parts and the relations of those parts ﬁx properties of wholes as a mat-
ter of natural law — ensure that Ap and Pp are nomologically necessar-
ily co-instantiated. If empirical results support option one, then
deciding amongst the possibilities within option one is not a straight-
forwardly empirical matter.
Option two encompasses cases in which Pp is instantiated but not
Ap (the usual focus) and cases in which Ap is instantiated but not Pp.
Even if it were a natural law that Pp unfailingly caused the instantia-
tion of Ap, they would come apart because Pp would be instantiated
before Ap (barring some strange simultaneous causation).
Deciding between possibilities within an option is not straightfor-
wardly empirical. However, deciding between the options should be.
The methodological challenge is to say how the methods of science are
adequate to that task. So, ﬁnally, we have arrived at a formulation of
an A-property that gives rise to a genuine empirical question. The
question is predicated on it turning out that subjects do instantiate the
property Ap identiﬁed above (as to which there is reasonable evidence,
sufﬁcient to make the question of interest).
Empirical Options
(i) Pp and Ap are always co-instantiated.
(ii) There are subjects S and times t such that:
(a) Pp(S)-at-t and {Ap(S)-at-t}; or
(b) Ap(S)-at-t and {Pp(S)-at-t}.
The methodological challenge is to show that deciding between (i)
and (ii) is susceptible to empirical investigation at all. Although there
are several ways that each option could be true, the leading candidates
are as follows:
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Both kinds of arrows represent direct causal links. On the supposi-
tion that we discover an information-processing mechanism for global
availability, it is plausible that many or most of the behaviours used as
initial tests of phenomenality would be caused by Ap. On the left: Pp is
always co-instantiated with Ap, and so is as tightly connected to the
behavioural signs as is Ap (Pp will actually be a cause, if Pp = Ap). On
the right: Pp typically causes the information that p to be made glob-
ally available, and thereby causes the behavioural signs of conscious-
ness. However, we do not exclude the possibility that being
phenomenally conscious that p might directly cause particular behavio-
ural outcomes, unmediated by the information becoming globally avail-
able. Those potential causal connections are represented by broken
arrows on the right.
3. A Beguiling Thought Dismissed
This section identiﬁes a beguiling thought which underpins much of the
intuitive force of the methodological challenge. It may derive from
thinking about access consciousness in one of the ways above that rules
out at the outset the possibility of knowing about phenomenality with-
out access. In this section we will see that the force of the beguiling
thought evaporates once we formulate Ap in a way that produces a
genuine empirical question and leaves open the possibility that Pp is a
separate natural property.
The beguiling thought is that our way of identifying instances of Pp
via Ap must be the most secure, on pain on undermining the enquiry.
Surely, the thought runs, if taking Ap to be good evidence of Pp is the
very basis on which we come to identify further evidential tests for the Pp
phenomenon, we could never think that those further tests were more
reliable tests of Pp than is Ap itself, or the whole basis of the inquiry
would be undermined? As Block puts it, ‘any evidence would inevitably
derive from the reportability of a phenomenally conscious state, and so it
could not tell us about the phenomenal consciousness of a state which
cannot be reported’ (2007, p. 483). How could an investigation wholly
founded on the idea that the presence or absence of Ap is good evidence
Pp(S) / Ap(S)
S’s verbal report that p
S’s use of p to carry out
voluntary actions 
Pp and Ap always
co-instantiated
S’s consciously remembering a
previously-presented perceptual
stimulus that carries the
information that p 
S’s voluntary perceptual
discrimination based on p
Pp(S) / Ap(S) = 
there is some
constitutive connection
between Pp and Ap
Pp(S) Ap(S)
typically causes
S’s verbal report that p
S’s voluntary perceptual
discrimination based on p
S’s use of p to carry out
voluntary actions 
Pp and Ap come apart
in actual cases
= potential causal connection
= causal connection S’s consciously remembering apreviously-presented perceptual
stimulus that carries the
information that p 
Figure 1 Relations between Pp and Ap.
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for the presence and absence of Pp give rise to a test according to which a
subject lacking property Ap nevertheless instantiated Pp?
That way of putting the challenge presupposes that our initial lines
of evidence are only evidence of Pp because they are evidence of Ap
which is in turn evidence for Pp. But we saw above that, if we are not
ruling it out that phenomenality and access could be separate natural
properties, we should take the initial lines of evidence as evidence for
Pp irrespective of their connection with Ap; they would be evidence for
Pp even if we discover there is no such property as Ap. So we should
reject the idea that the evidential force of the initial lines of evidence
derives from the evidential force of Ap as evidence for Pp.
Nevertheless, if there is a mechanism of global availability of infor-
mation, then it is likely that the initial lines of evidence like giving a
verbal report are caused by the subject’s instantiating Ap. (We are not
ruling it out that a subject could display evidence of Pp, for example by
using the information that p to plan a voluntary action, without instan-
tiating Ap even though she has a mechanism of conscious access — a
possibility we return to below.) If all or most of the initial behavioural
tests are caused by Ap, then instantiating Ap must also be strong evi-
dence that the subject instantiates Pp.
If we start with our initial lines of evidence and discover a mecha-
nism Ap that mediates them, could we ever come up with stronger evi-
dence for Pp than the instantiation of Ap, or stronger evidence for Pp
than Ap? Working with instances of Pp identiﬁed through our initial
means of identiﬁcation, we generate another test Tp for the presence of
Pp. Let’s say that test Tp trumps Ap iff Tp disagrees with Ap about the
presence or absence of Pp and we rely on property Tp over property Ap
as diagnostic of the presence or absence of Pp. Trumping is a matter of
what we take the relative strength of the two sources of evidence to be.
Tp can trump Ap in one of two ways:
Tp trumps Ap iff
(a) Tp(S) & Ap(S) is good evidence that Pp(S); or
(b) Tp(S) & Ap(S) is good evidence that Pp(S).
The beguiling thought is that, in an enquiry founded on identifying
instances of Pp by means which all depend causally on Ap, if empirical
study of those instances were to generate a test Tp that trumps Ap, that
would be inconsistent with our starting assumption, thereby undermin-
ing the whole inquiry.
Chalmers appears in places to be motivated by something like this
thought. He starts with the claim that, to get evidence of a link
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between a neural process N and consciousness we must already have
evidence of a link between N and his A-consciousness property, ‘aware-
ness’ (Chalmers 1996, p. 239). He goes on to argue as follows:
‘It is very plausible that some kind of awareness is necessary
for consciousness. Certainly, all the instances of consciousness
that I know about are accompanied by awareness. There seems
to be little reason to believe in any instances of consciousness
without the accompanying functional processes. If there are
any, we have no evidence for them, not even indirect evidence,
and we could not in principle. It therefore is reasonable to sup-
pose on the grounds of parsimony that wherever there is con-
sciousness, there is awareness. If we are wrong about this — if
for example a static electron has the rich conscious life of a
Proust — then we will certainly never know about it.’ (Chal-
mers 1996, p. 243–4)
Chalmers’ position makes sense if access is deﬁned in one of the ways
that we set aside in the last section. But does the argument still run if
we leave open the possibility that Pp and Ap are natural properties,
and that the question whether they dissociate is an empirical one? The
idea that the initial basis of our investigation of a phenomenon must
remain secure has some superﬁcial plausibility, but does not survive
close scrutiny. To see why not, we should start with a precise statement
of the supposed challenge:
The beguiling thought
At the start of enquiry, all cases that are studied empirically as
instances of Pp are identiﬁed as such because they have prop-
erty Ap (and all instances of Pp because Ap): initially there
is no evidence for instances of Pp that do not have property Ap
or instances of Ap that do not have property Pp. Therefore, we
could not, even in principle, have any direct or indirect evi-
dence that a subject S is such that Pp(S) & Ap(S) or such that
Pp(S) & Ap(S).
The idea that this is a general principle that applies whatever proper-
ties are being studied is superﬁcially plausible, but false. This history
of science if full of counterexamples (e.g. water ⁄ H2O). Our tactic in
the rest of the paper will be ﬁrst, to spell out carefully how science
does manage to transcend initial lines of evidence in other cases, and
second, to show that there is no bar to deploying the same method
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in the study of phenomenal consciousness. In my view quite a lot of
the discussion of the methodological difﬁculty of studying Pp in the
presence of Ap can be traced to the idea that the beguiling thought is
a general truth.
An example we will return to below illustrates how things go with
ordinary sciences. Genes were initially identiﬁed by means of the now-
familiar signature of Mendelian inheritance, with traits passing down the
generations in patterns that seem to depend on the particulate inheri-
tance of dominant or recessive genes for those traits. Genes were hypoth-
esised as being the causal basis of these patterns of inheritance. It then
took years of investigation to discover that DNA was the basis of these
patterns of inheritance. But DNA-based inheritance is far from perfectly
Mendelian. So we can now identify genes — as stretches of DNA — in
cases where the original Mendelian means of identiﬁcation do not apply.
Knowledge of the natural property underlying the phenomenon picked
out by our initial means of identiﬁcation has allowed us to generate new
means of identiﬁcation which trump the original ones.
That is just the familiar story about how we can move beyond our
initial means of identifying a natural property. Phenomenal properties
may be disanalogous in various ways. But it shows that there is no
good general argument that our initial means of identifying a property
must be the most secure on pain of undermining the inquiry.
Probabilistic Treatment
Another way to see the beguiling thought is to express it in terms of
probabilistic degrees of belief. We must start the inquiry with a high
degree of belief in Ap as evidence of Pp. The empirical study is founded
on identifying instances Pp and Pp via behavioural evidence that is
caused by Ap (we are supposing). So we must start with Pr(Pp|Ap) and
Pr(Pp|Ap) being high. The inquiry then proceeds to identify some
further property Tp that is common to most of the so-judged Pp
instances and distinctive of them by comparison to the non-Pp
instances (the test Tp may be a complex conjunctive property). So we
come to have Pr(Pp|Tp) and Pr(Pp|Tp) both high. The beguiling
thought is that we should not reach that conclusion at the cost
of abandoning our belief in the probative value of Ap. So we must
continue to think that Pr(Pp|Ap) and Pr(Pp|Ap) are both high (cor-
relatively, that Pr(Pp|Ap) and Pr(Pp|Ap) are both low). Giving those
up would be to undermine the basis on which we predicated our study,
leaving no reason for our conﬁdence in test Tp to be high (i.e. for
Pr(Pp|Tp) and Pr(Pp|Tp) to be high).
That is all very well. But what about the crucial issue: is it coherent
to think that Tp trumps Ap? Here the focus is on the degree of belief in
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Pp|(Tp&Ap) and in Pp|(Tp&Ap). The beguiling thought is that
these must be low since our degree of belief in Pp|Ap and in Pp|Ap
must be low. So the question, from a probabilistic perspective, is
whether the following can form a coherent set:
The beguiling thought is that (3a) conﬂicts with (1a) and (3b) with
(1b). Tempting though that thought is, it is wrong. It can be perfectly
rational to distribute subjective probabilities in accordance with (1a),
(1b), (2a), (2b), (3a) and (3b). The distribution of Pp in the Ap and
Ap regions required by (1a) and (1b) does not by itself constrain the
distribution of Pp in the {Tp&Ap} and {Tp&Ap} regions. You can
think that Ap is a very good sign of Pp except in the presence of Tp.
So the empirical enquiry can conclude that in some cases Tp trumps Ap
as a sign of Pp, while holding on to Ap as a good sign of Pp. The
Appendix offers a proof.
A further consideration is also relevant here. You might think that,
although Pr(Pp|Ap) and Pr(Pp|Tp) could both be high, Pr(Pp|Ap) must
always be higher than Pr(Pp|Tp), since Pr(Pp|Ap) being high formed the
basis on which we came to think that Tp is evidence for Pp. But that is
a bad thought too. We might only have moderate conﬁdence in
Pr(Pp|Ap) and still use Ap to generate a large sample of putative
instances of Pp. Then we may have a very high conﬁdence that most of
them are instances of Pp; in particular, our conﬁdence in that may far
exceed our Pr(Pp(S)|Ap(S)) for a single case. If we then use that large
sample to generate the new test Tp, it may well be that Tp turns out to
be a better test of Pp for a single case, so that Pr(Pp(S)|Tp(S)) >
Pr(Pp(S)|Ap(S)).
That shows the consistency of a synchronic set of degrees of belief
about the distribution of Pp, Ap and TP. However, the real question, of
course, is how the degrees of belief we have in Pp|Ap and Pp|Ap at
the outset of the inquiry (both high) constrain the posterior degrees of
belief we can assign to Pp|(Tp&Ap) and Pp|(Tp&Ap). Since we have
shown the coherence of a synchronic set of degrees of belief according
to which these are all high, there can be no belief-revision story accord-
ing to which having high priors for Pp|Ap and Pp|Ap prevents us
arriving at high posterior probabilities for Pp|(Tp&Ap) and
Pp|(Tp&Ap).
Initial evidence: Pr(Pp|Ap) high Pr(Pp|Ap) high
equivalently: (1a) Pr(Pp|Ap) low (1b) Pr(Pp|Ap) low
Further test: (2a) Pr(Pp|Tp) high (2b) Pr(Pp|Tp) high
Trumping: (3a) Pr(Pp|{Tp&Ap}) high (3b) Pr(Pp|{Tp&Ap}) high
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To summarise, although the beguiling thought sounds plausible,
when we are studying a natural property there is no general reason
why our initial means of identiﬁcation should restrict the inquiry in
that way. That is not a conclusive answer to the methodological chal-
lenge, but it defeats one version of the challenge and brings out what is
at stake. If there is a problem about getting evidence that Pp is distinct
from Ap, it depends upon speciﬁc features of phenomenal and access
consciousness. The supposed methodological problem must arise from
some restriction on reasonable priors connecting Ap, Pp, our initial
lines of evidence, and other potential tests.
We dismissed one such restriction in section 2 — a formulation of
A-consciousness according to which it is epistemically impossible to
know about cases of P without A or the converse. But even if we are
leaving it open that Pp and Ap are natural properties, there may be
other reasons why consciousness is a special case. The next section
identiﬁes the most plausible candidate and the remainder of the paper
shows how it can be overcome.
4. The Methodological Challenge
Standardly, when we investigate a natural property our initial means of
identiﬁcation are defeasible because they work by picking out proper-
ties that are not constitutive of the kind. We pick out water by its
liquidity and transparency, but being liquid and transparent are not
necessary properties of H2O (either metaphysically or nomologically).
Block argues that there is a special problem if, at the outset of the
investigation, we are uncertain whether our means of identiﬁcation are
like that:
‘The problem does not arise in the study of, for example,
water. On the basis of the study of the nature of accessible
water, we can know the properties of water in environments
outside our light cone — that is, in environments that are too
far away in space and time for signals travelling at the speed
of light to reach us. We have no problem in extrapolating from
the observed to the unobserved, and even unobservable in the
case of water, because we are antecedently certain that our
cognitive access to water molecules is not part of the constitu-
tive scientiﬁc nature of water itself. … Few scientiﬁcally
minded people in the twenty-ﬁrst century would suppose that
water molecules are partly constituted by our cognitive access
to them (Boghossian 2006), but few would be sure whether
phenomenal consciousness is or is not partly constituted by
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cognitive access to it. It is this asymmetry that is at the root of
the methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness. [The
issue is] whether the machinery of cognitive accessibility is a
constitutive part of the nature of phenomenal consciousness.’
(Block 2007, p. 483)
The problem, supposedly peculiar to phenomenality, is that we are
antecedently uncertain whether, if there is an information processing
property Ap, that property is partly constitutive of Pp. Block’s chal-
lenge is to show that we can answer the empirical question of whether
Pp and Ap come apart in any actual cases in the face of this antecedent
uncertainty.
The passage quoted suggests a general phenomenon: antecedent
uncertainty about a constitutive connection would always produce this
kind of methodological difﬁculty. However, there are good examples
of that kind of uncertainty being overcome in other cases. For exam-
ple, the atomic number of Californium was amongst the initial means
by which instances of that element were identiﬁed, but that didn’t
stop much more being learnt about the element once it had been syn-
thesised (its atomic structure, the half-life of its various isotopes, etc.).
So it doesn’t seem to be a problem if one of the initial means of
identiﬁcation is constitutively connected to the property being investi-
gated. Indeed, if we were to start again in our study of gold but to
add its atomic number to the familiar list of identiﬁable properties,
then it is not obvious that problems would ensue. Identiﬁcation by
atomic number would be up for revision in the light of subsequent
evidence, just like all the other means of identiﬁcation, but wouldn’t
end up being revised. These are cases where we could be antecedently
uncertain but then come to discover that one particular property used
as evidence was always co-instantiated with the property under inves-
tigation.
There are also cases where antecedent uncertainty has been resolved
against the means of identiﬁcation being constitutive. If you want
to know whether two individuals are members of the same species,
similarities and differences in their DNA are a very good guide. Indeed,
having a genome with certain DNA properties could have been constit-
utive of species membership. For some time that was a live theoretical
option. It turned out to be false. There is still debate about the best
way of understanding species, but on no view are genetic properties
now thought to be constitutive of species membership. The best
account of species membership is that it is a matter of standing in an
historical relation of common descent to your conspeciﬁcs — belonging
to a given clade. So there was antecedent uncertainty about whether
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genetic properties were constitutive of species membership, as well as
being a means of identifying species membership. Subsequent investiga-
tion revealed that they are not.
There may be important disanalogies between these cases and phe-
nomenal consciousness. What they show is that the problem Block iden-
tiﬁes, which doubtless does present methodological difﬁculties, can be
overcome in other areas of science. We argue below that the approaches
used in other areas can also work with phenomenal consciousness.
A preliminary disanalogy is the mind-dependence of the psychologi-
cal states involved. With Californium and biological species we are
working with mind-independent means of identiﬁcation of an uncontro-
versially mind-independent natural property. Is it right to think of the
‘‘means of identiﬁcation’’ we use for picking out instances of Pp in the
same way? We argue that it is.
Both Pp and Ap are mind-dependent properties in the sense that they
are mental properties. Are they mind-dependent in the sense at issue in
literature on secondary qualities and response dependence? There are
two candidates for the response on which the property being identiﬁed
putatively depends: the initial lines of evidence and property Ap itself.
Taking the ﬁrst, it could turn out that there is nothing more to prop-
erty Pp than a subject’s disposition to make a verbal report that she
sees ⁄hears ⁄… that p. Taking the second, it could turn out that there is
nothing more to instantiating Pp than the subject’s having the informa-
tion that p globally available (i.e. being in state Ap). The question of
response dependence asks whether either of these is constitutive or
partly constitutive of Pp. That is simply to ask whether one of the
means of identiﬁcation is constitutively connected to Pp.
In section 2 we set aside a priori response dependence (Wright
1988). If we are leaving it open as an empirical possibility that Pp is a
veriﬁcation-transcendent natural property, then we should treat the ini-
tial lines of evidence and Ap as some properties by which we identify
others. A subject’s verbal report is a means by which we identify that
she is likely to instantiate Pp. Similarly gathering other evidence
(beyond the initial lines of evidence) that a subject has property Ap
(e.g. recording a pattern of coherent neural ﬁring indicative of the
global availability of information) is a means of identifying that she is
likely to instantiate Pp.
In the secondary qualities debate, we ask whether being red is a
property possessed by the surface of objects independently of their rela-
tion to human experiences, or whether being red is a surface’s disposi-
tion to produce a certain kind of visual experience in human observers
(in certain circumstances). Confusingly, the observer’s experience of red
in the secondary qualities debate corresponds to Ap in our debate. Pp
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corresponds to the putative property of the surface.5 The question is
whether there is such a property which is independent of Ap. Just as
the failure to ﬁnd a surface reﬂectance property to identify with being
red motivates a secondary quality account of colour, the failure to ﬁnd
a property independent of Ap to identify with Pp motivates an account
of phenomenality according to which Ap and Pp are constitutively
connected (and thus always co-instantiated). Asking a response-
dependence-type question about Pp is just to ask whether Ap (or any of
the other means of identiﬁcation) is constitutively connected to Pp.
Whether it is or not, Pp is clearly a psychological property. But if Pp is
studied as a natural property, Pp’s being psychological poses no special
issue as far as response dependence is concerned.
It is Ap’s being a psychological property that gives rise to the
response dependence question, but that is simply the question of
whether one of the means of identiﬁcation of Pp is constitutively-con-
nected to Pp. In this section we argued that there is no general problem
with overcoming antecedent uncertainty about that. The task of the
next section is to show that the way that uncertainty is surmounted in
other areas of science is equally applicable to the study of phenomenal
consciousness.
5. Application of the Natural Kind Methodology
We argue that the methodological problem is relatively tractable pro-
vided Pp is a natural kind: a natural property that supports a wide
range of inductions. Our suggestion is that science should investigate
the natural kinds that are responsible for generating and unifying the
various behaviours that we take to be evidence of Pp. The rough idea
is that, if we ﬁnd only one underlying natural kind, that is evidence
that Ap and Pp are always co-instantiated. (In the same way as in the
secondary qualities debate the absence of a second property with which
to identify redness leads to the view that redness is constitutively
connected to our means of identifying redness.) If we discover two
underlying natural kinds, that is some evidence that Pp and Ap come
apart, although that case is more complicated and is developed further
in section 6.
Our account is in the same spirit as Block (2007), in that it relies on
inference to the best explanation. However, it says more than Block
does about the structure that inference will take and how to generate
the appropriate data. Block’s inference is mainly based on his interpre-
tation of an experiment by Landmann et al. (2003), a reﬁnement of
5 See the right-hand diagram at the end of section 2 above.
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Sperling (1960) that uses an array of oriented rectangles. He argues
that those experiments show that the capacity of phenomenality
exceeds the capacity of global availability (diﬀerent capacity ﬁ non-
identity). Block also points to a ‘mesh’ between psychological and neu-
roscientiﬁc data, but the psychological data bear most of the weight.
We argue that a more satisfactory answer to the empirical question will
require a larger variety of sources of evidence. The suggestion is not
just that there should be more data. The crucial point is that the data
should be generated and interrogated in a particular way.
Natural Kinds in Psychology
Discovering a natural kind allows us to move beyond our initial means
of identiﬁcation. We will see how that process works in science in gen-
eral, and in particular in psychology, before going on to apply it to the
particular case of consciousness.
Psychology has discovered many natural kinds, with a variety of
substrates, but two examples will have to sufﬁce. The ﬁrst is the collec-
tion of language deﬁcits that can be produced by brain damage. A
great variety of deﬁcits was observed before it was discovered that
patients fall into various groups. One group has good language com-
prehension but non-ﬂuent agrammatical speech. Another group has
poor language comprehension but produces ﬂuent seemingly grammati-
cal speech. It was discovered that the ﬁrst group forms a natural kind
uniﬁed by the existence of damage to areas of the left ventrolateral pre-
frontal cortex (Broca’s area) and underlying areas. The second set of
behavioural symptoms cluster together in virtue of a common mecha-
nism of damage in the left posterior temporal cortex (Wernicke’s area).
(There are further groups, e.g. conduction aphasia, and reﬁnements of
these groups.) In both cases there is an underlying natural property
that gives rise to the set of behavioural symptoms and underpins induc-
tions from case to case.
Sleep research furnishes an example in normal subjects. Evidence is
gathered about properties of sleepers (heart rate, respiratory rate, eye
movements) and their behaviour (how they respond to stimuli, what
they say when they wake up). Such symptoms form a number of clus-
ters, each associated with a different underlying state of brain activity
as measured by EEG. The clusters support inductions from case to case
(e.g. a slow-wave EEG trace predicts a lower heart rate and various
other behaviours). Although the mechanisms have not yet been charac-
terised fully, there is good evidence that REM sleep, say, forms a natu-
ral kind that is uniﬁed by an underlying causal process in the brain
and body.
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The natural kind methodology, as we will call it, is to gather
together as many putative tests of a phenomenon as possible, ranging
widely across types of evidence collected. It then interrogates the data
to look for ‘‘nomological clusters’’:
Nomological cluster
A set of evidential properties Ti form a nomological cluster iff
(i) they are instantiated together better than chance (given
background theory); and
(ii) observing subsets of the cluster supports induction to other
elements of the cluster.
A nomological cluster supports inductive inference from some of the Ti
to others: e.g. a patient identiﬁed as a Wernicke’s aphasic behaviourally
is likely to have damage to the left posterior temporal cortex. It also
supports inductive inference to new cases: e.g. if we discover that a
group of Broca’s aphasics show little semantic priming, we expect that
a new patient with good comprehension and non-ﬂuent agrammatical
speech is likely to show little semantic priming. If the success of those
inductive inferences is not pure chance it is because there is some natu-
ral reason why the properties over which we induce tend to cluster
together. If so we can say they form a natural kind. The property in
virtue of which they so cluster can also be called a natural kind or a
natural kind property. A nomological cluster can be explained by the
existence of a natural kind to which the Ti are nomologically related
causally or constitutively.
Philosophers mean several different things by ‘natural kind’. A
Lockean approach restricts the term to cases where some inner intrinsic
essence is responsible for the identiﬁable symptoms (Putnam 1975).
That would exclude cases where the property explaining the cluster
was extrinsic. For example the property of being a member of a given
biological species is partly an historical property, with similarities in
surface properties explained by the fact that conspeciﬁc individuals are
related by a process of descent, involving conservative copying of fea-
tures, from the very same individual (i.e., by being members of the
same clade). We are adopting a much broader conception of natural
kinds according to which any natural property that supports induction
as a result of nomological principles or natural laws counts as a natural
kind (Hacking 1991, Griﬃths 1997, Millikan 2000). That would include
the cladistic property of being a member of a given biological species.
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For a natural property to be a natural kind is then a matter of degree,
depending upon how broad and various are the properties over which
it supports inductions. For the purpose of answering the methodologi-
cal challenge, it doesn’t matter whether Pp is intrinsic or extrinsic, just
that it is a natural property that supports a range of inductions.
Provided Pp is a natural kind within that broad family it will under-
pin the success of the inductive and explanatory practices in which our
concept of Pp is deployed, even if the only means of identifying
instances of Pp are imperfect. Granted, if false positives and ⁄or false
negatives are widespread enough, those inductive practices will fail.
But they can succeed well enough to be useful in the face of some
misidentiﬁcations.
With some of the concepts used in science it is part of the concep-
tion associated with the concept that the referent is whatever property
plays a certain explanatory role. However, in order to pick out a natu-
ral kind, it is not necessary that a concept be explicitly a theoretical or
explanatory role concept. We perform inductions over many properties
which we simply identify and co-project, without it being part of the
structure of the concept that the referent is whatever property plays a
certain explanatory role. In our view, reference to the natural kind
in these kinds of cases is established just in virtue of the fact that a
natural kind in fact underpins the success of the inductive practices of
concept-users deploying those concepts (Millikan 2000).
For example, even if water is not an explanatory role concept, it
remains true that the reason we can project observed properties of
water (transparency, action as a solute) to new cases is because of the
electron shells of hydrogen and oxygen atoms and of how they com-
bine (i.e. their chemical properties). The property of dissolving sugar,
observed true of one body of stuff identiﬁed as odourless, colourless,
transparent, potable liquid, carries over and is true of other bodies of
stuff identiﬁed as odourless, colourless, transparent potable liquids
because they are H2O. That these considerations are sufﬁcient for refer-
ence to a natural kind is a substantive assumption, but it will be true
on quite a variety of semantic theories, and it is something that ought
to be a constraint on, or at least a desideratum for, any theory of the
reference of these concepts. (Shea 2007, pp. 254-5 argues for this
sort of constraint in giving a theory of the content of more low-level
representations, below the level of concepts.)
Studying Pp as a Natural Kind
The ﬁrst stage is to investigate cases that we take, relying on current
evidence, to be instances of Pp, and to ﬁnd further properties that are
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common to and distinctive of most of those instances. Some of this
data may concern particular neural processes, like the presence of
synchronic neural ﬁring in the 40 Hz waveband or locally recurrent
activation. It may also concern particular neural structures, like cor-
tico-thalamic loops or cortical networks that integrate prefrontal cortex
with other cortical areas. Some may be characterised in terms of infor-
mation processing properties, others not. (The methodological sceptic,
of course, will claim that these are all just properties of the Ap mecha-
nism; or, at best, of the mechanisms of Ap and Pp combined.)
Another source of evidence will concern what phenomenal con-
sciousness does for us — it will look for ways of characterising the
functional proﬁle of the instances taken to fall within our conception
of Pp. One example makes use of two different ways of conditioning
the eye blink response. It seems that ‘trace conditioning’ requires phe-
nomenal consciousness whereas ‘delay conditioning’ does not. In delay
conditioning a puff of air to the eye is administered during the occur-
rence of a tone (after the start of the tone, hence ‘delay’ conditioning).
Delay conditioning dissociates from subjects’ reports about the contin-
gency between tone and air puff (Perruchet 1985). In trace conditioning
the air puff occurs shortly after the tone has stopped. Unlike delay
conditioning, trace conditioning seems to depend upon the subject’s
being able to report the contingency between tone and air puff (Clark
et al. 2001, Clark and Squire 1998, Perruchet et al. 2006). So trace con-
ditioning correlates with and delay conditioning dissociates from phe-
nomenal consciousness (as measured by verbal report).
The functional signature of Pp can be probed in a large variety of
ingenious ways (Jack and Shallice 2001 defend a similar method and
give examples). For example, ‘negative stem completion’ seems to go
with phenomenal consciousness (Debner and Jacoby 1994). Subjects
are brieﬂy shown a written word, followed by the ﬁrst three letters of
that word. The task is to complete the stem to make any word other
than the word originally shown. For example, shown frigid then fri the
subject could say ‘fright’; ‘frigid’ would be an incorrect response.
Masking is used to manipulate whether subjects are phenomenally
conscious of the original word. When subjects do not consciously see
the original word, they tend to respond incorrectly, that is they use the
original word to complete the stem (an unconscious priming effect).
Only when phenomenally conscious of the original word do subjects
avoid that tendency (see Merikle et al. 2001 for a review). Another task
that appears to require phenomenality is making discriminations
among novel conjunctions of perceptual features. To do this, the sub-
ject may need ﬁrst consciously to experience a stimulus displaying that
conjunction (Jack and Shallice 2001, p. 174).
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Candidate functional tests are ones which either seem to require phe-
nomenal consciousness, or which are performed in a different way
when the relevant parameters form part of the subject’s phenomenal
consciousness,6 so that the mechanism deployed when performing the
task relying on phenomenality has a diﬀerent functional signature from
the non-phenomenal mechanism for performing the task. There are
many other candidates: recombining and re-using elements of a plan,
spontaneous generation of behaviour, spontaneously noticing a feature
of an unchanging perceptual stimulus, etc.
Some tests seem closely connected to global availability (e.g. investi-
gating consciousness in animals via meta-memory: Hampton 2001 and
Shea & Heyes 2010). Others like the trace conditioning example above
are not obviously connected to global availability (although they may
turn out to depend upon it, if we discover that Pp and Ap are always
co-instantiated). There is no obvious reason why trace conditioning
should, but delay conditioning should not, depend upon global avail-
ability of information. So far we know just that trace conditioning
comes with phenomenality. That may be because it comes and goes
with Ap, but if Pp and Ap do in fact dissociate in actual cases, it could
equally well be that trace conditioning comes and goes because of the
nature of Pp, irrespective of its connection to Ap.
The following list gives some examples of the sorts of tests that can
be deployed in investigating Pp as a natural kind. Only those in group
(a) seem to be directly dependent on Ap:-
Putative tests — Ti
(a) Connected to global availability of information:
 Report of one amongst many features, cued after the stimulus
has been masked, of a complex visual stimulus, Sperling (1960),
Landman et al. (2003)
 Meta-memory, Hampton (2001)
 Insensitivity to the automatic stem completion eﬀect, Debner &
Jacoby (1994), Merikle et al. (2001)
 Integration of information by prefrontal cortex
6 For example, if consciousness signiﬁcantly improves performance on a task (rather
than being essential for it), or produces a distinctive pattern of errors, doing the
task in the consciousness-involving way will thereby have a distinctive functional
signature.
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(b) Connected to information processing but not necessarily glo-
bal availability:
• Susceptibility of grip width to the size contrast eﬀect, Hu &
Goodale (2000)
• Trace conditioning (vs. delay conditioning), Clark et al. (2001)
• Perceptual discrimination of a novel conjunction of perceptual
features, Jack & Shallice (2001)
(c) Not characterised in information processing terms:
n 40 Hz ⁄ gamma-band neural synchrony
n Local recurrence in cortex
n Cortico-thalamic loops
n Networks involving prefrontal cortex
Once there is a wide variety of data we can look for nomologi-
cal clusters. For our purposes the important question is whether there
is one cluster or two (or more). To assess that requires some sophis-
ticated causal modelling of the network of connections between the
various tests Ti (Pearl 2000). That is by no means straightfor-
ward. Nor is it merely a mechanical process. Application of causal
models relies on various assumptions, some of which are conten-
tious when considering the metaphysics of causation. However, legiti-
mate questions about the suitability of these models as accounts of
causation do not undermine the reliance we place on them here,
which requires only that there is a viable epistemology of causation:
a way of gathering evidence as to what the causal relationships
are amongst various properties that have been empirically observed
across a variety of instances and of inferring the existence of under-
lying causes.
One Cluster
If we ﬁnd only one cluster amongst the Ti, then we will have discovered
good evidence that Pp and Ap are always co-instantiated: [Fig. 2]
The arrows in the diagram represent causal effects of Ap. For exam-
ple, it could turn out that the global availability of information is
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achieved by gamma-band neural synchrony across long-range cortical
networks that allows information in the back of the brain to be inte-
grated in the prefrontal cortex. That would be our natural kind Ap.
Our causal modelling might show that Ap itself was the most likely
cause of verbal reports etc. (our initial tests), and of the symptoms sub-
sequently found to covary with those tests (e.g. trace conditioning,
gamma-band EEG traces, etc.). If no other property were discovered
underlying the co-projection of all the tests Ti, then that would be good
evidence that Pp is identical to Ap, or co-instantiated as a matter of at
least nomological necessity.
A sceptic might claim that it is still possible that Pp and Ap are only
causally connected, but that Ap causally screens off our access to Pp,
so that the only way we can detect the presence of Pp is via detecting
Ap. (That would be a causal analogue of the beguiling thought — that
Ap screens off our epistemic access to Pp — dismissed in section 3.)
However, if Pp and Ap are different natural kinds, with Pp causing Ap,
it is implausible that Pp should be causally inaccessible except via Ap.
The initial tests may depend causally on Ap and thereby ensure that
Pp is always co-present with Ap in our initial sample, but if there are
two natural kinds, then both properties are present in our in-group and
both properties are absent in our out-group. If we investigate all the
effects of the properties in our in-group we will get downstream conse-
quences of both Pp and Ap. Effects of both will be absent from the
out-group. As a separate natural property Pp will have causal conse-
quences that do not proceed via Ap. The methodological challenge is
that it is difﬁcult to tell which are which, not that Pp is totally causally
isolated behind Ap.
By analogy, consider the comedy duo Pen and Teller. Pen is always
silent. If you shut your eyes, your only evidence about whether Pen is
present is the testimony of Teller. Nevertheless, Pen is not causally
screened off, so you can rely on Teller to say when Pen is there and















Figure 2 Pp and Ap always co-instantiated
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or sight). If Pen is a separate person it is implausible that all his actual
and potential causal effects on the world should proceed via Teller.
On any view, brains will play an important role in instantiating Pp.
And if Pp causes Ap it is overwhelming likely that Pp is instantiated
before Ap in time. But there is no reason to suppose that the goings on
in human brains before Ap is instantiated will have no causal conse-
quences except to give rise to state Ap. All the usual brain measures
have the potential to detect Pp directly (EEG, MEG, PET, fMRI, etc.),
and there will likely be functional tests too. So the causal isolation idea
is a non-starter.
Two Clusters
So much for the conclusions we would reach if the empirical investiga-
tions uncover only one underlying natural kind. Our method may
instead discover that there are two natural kinds underlying instances
to which our concept of Pp was initially applied, one of which is actu-
ally instantiated separately from Ap on some occasions.
For instance, suppose we discover a mechanism of global availability
as before: gamma-band neural synchrony across long-range cortical
networks connecting the prefrontal cortex with posterior areas of the
brain (Kind2). Suppose we also discover a second underlying kind that
is also common to most of the instances in our initial sample. It might
be a more local kind of connectivity: local cortical-cortical resonance
sustained by cortico-thalamic loops (Kind1). (To contrast with the Ap
mechanism we can suppose that the cortico-thalamic loops are ‘vertical’
and so do not sustain strong interactions between distantly-separated
cortical areas.) What do we say about someone who has colour infor-
mation resonating in a local cortical-cortical circuit sustained by a ver-
tical cortico-thalamic loop (Kind1) without that information being
made globally available via long-range neural synchrony (Kind2 ⁄ Ap)?
Since Kind1 and Kind2 were co-present in our initial sample (verbal
report etc.), either could have been the property in virtue of which
those subjects were conscious. The fact that Ap is absent in this partic-
ular case should not lead us to conclude that Pp is absent (since we
have ruled out tying Pp to Ap a priori), and the fact that another natu-
ral kind underlying the original samples is present (Kind1) gives us
some evidence that this kind is Pp.
To illustrate, we may ﬁnd that Kind2 ⁄ Ap is the cause of verbal
report, meta-memory and gamma-band EEG traces, and that Kind1 is
the cause of trace conditioning, susceptibility of grip width to the size
contrast effect, and the ability to detect novel conjunctions of visual
features. In normal cases Kind1 causes Kind2, so these tests are
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normally all present or all absent (provided co-operating mechanisms
like language are not otherwise disabled). But in unusual cases they
come apart, which allows us to see that there are two clusters of tests,
each underpinned by a different underlying kind. Figure 3 illustrates
the usual case where Pp causes Ap. In the rarer cases where only Pp is
present only the Ti on the left would be found. The Ti on the right
would be absent.
If Pp and Ap are in fact two kinds which come apart in actual cases,
then casting our net of tests widely is likely to encompass some
instances where Pp occurs in the absence of Ap, and so deliver evidence
that Pp is a separate natural kind. Correlatively, if a wide empirical
enquiry of the sort suggested here furnishes a large number and variety
of tests Ti that cluster on a single underlying natural kind, that is good
abductive evidence that Ap and Pp are always co-instantiated.
Of course, the clustering of the Ti may show that neither empirical
option we were considering is correct. We leave for another day the
question of what to say about phenomenality if it turns out that there
are many different natural kinds (or none). For present purposes, it is
enough to observe that, as well as deciding between them, the natural
kind methodology is capable of delivering evidence that neither of the
hypotheses between which we are trying to decide is true.
For completeness we should notice that the methodology will give































Figure 4 Causal modelling of the Ti could uncover many clusters
with complex interrelations.
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will be stronger than the original evidential tests (verbal report and the
like), perhaps individually and certainly collectively. So if it turns out
that there are two underlying natural kinds, the tests Ti will allow us to
pick out cases of Pp without Ap, even if the original means of identiﬁ-
cation of Pp would have told us that they were not cases of Pp.
6. Further Lines of Evidence
6.1 The pre-P Question
If the evidence shows that there is only one underlying natural kind,
then we have good reason to conclude that Pp and Ap are at least no-
mologically co-instantiated. That is the easier case. A discovery of two
underlying kinds would raise a further question.
If we discover two natural kinds how do we know that the ﬁrst kind
really is phenomenal? There is an alternative picture according to
which Pp and Ap are still always co-instantiated and Kind1 is a pre-
phenomenal natural kind that is a normal causal antecedent to the
Pp ⁄Ap kind. That alternative has not been conclusively eliminated, but
there is further evidence that can be brought to bear. The task is to
gather evidence to choose between the following two competing
hypotheses illustrated in Fig. 5 below.
The ﬁrst thing to say is that, even if the hypothesis of pre-Pp causing
Pp ⁄Ap has not been ruled out, the likelihood of the hypothesis that Pp
causes Ap has increased, since one of the ways that it could have been
false, namely if there had been only one underlying natural kind,
has been ruled out. But although its likelihood would have gone down,
discovering two underlying natural kinds would not rule out the
possibility that Kind1 is pre-Pp and not Pp. We address the issue in
two parts, distinguishing between ﬁrst-personal and third-personal ways
of identifying Pp.
First-personally, we can each know what we are phenomenally
conscious of in a very direct way in virtue of being phenomenally
conscious in that way (that knowledge need not be infallible or
Pp(S) Ap(S)
typically causes
S’s verbal report that p
S’s voluntary perceptual
discrimination based on p
S’s use of p to carry out
voluntary actions 
= potential causal connection
= causal connection S’s consciously remembering a
previously-presented perceptual
stimulus that carries the




S’s verbal report that p
S’s perceptual discrimination
based on p
S’s use of p to carry out
voluntary actions 
S’s consciously remembering a
previously-presented perceptual
stimulus that carries the
information that p 
Figure 5 Competing hypotheses given two underlying kinds.
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incorrigible). I am somehow able reliably to apply a phenomenal con-
cept of Pp to myself directly when I instantiate Pp, without making use
of any of the behavioural signs of consciousness. Third-personally, we
identify instances of Pp in others through identifying various other
properties (Ti). (We can also identify Pp in ourselves in these third-
personal ways.) We start by taking our concept of Pp to have only
third-personal modes of application. Section 6.3 discusses the purely
ﬁrst-personal concept and 6.2 the mixed case.
To assess whether Kind1 is Pp we inevitably have to take a stand on
issues about the semantics of the concept of Pp. Detailed treatment of
these issues is beyond the scope of the present paper, so we appeal here
to the plausibility of the principle above about the reference of con-
cepts that are relied on for co-projection and induction. If our concept
of Pp has only third-personal modes of application, then we can rely
directly on the argument above. We argued that irrespective of whether
we conceive of Pp as being the occupant of a functional role, our con-
cept refers to whatever property underpins the successful inductions in
which it is deployed. By hypothesis, Kind1 underpins some of those
inductions. For example, in the illustration from the last section Kind1
is local recurrence and the induction from trace conditioning to verbal
report proceeds via Kind1, as does the induction in the opposite direc-
tion, from meta-memory to susceptibility of grip width to the size con-
trast effect. Our large battery of tests normally cluster together because
Kind1 and Kind2 normally come and go together. Some of the cluster-
ing depends on direct causal connections of some of the Ti to Kind1.
So Pp refers to the basis of that clustering, namely Kind1.
An objector might suggest that, even if some scientiﬁc tests depend
on Kind1, all commonsense inductions about being phenomenally con-
scious proceed only via Kind2 ⁄ Ap. But that is implausible if Kind1
and Kind2 are normally co-present. For example, we have a lot of
everyday knowledge about causal interventions that will abolish the
phenomenal property of having a pain in the foot. We can take
codeine, undergo acupuncture, re-direct our attention or breathe dee-
ply. Even if some of those routes work just by abolishing Apain it is
implausible that they all should. Once we accept the point above about
Pp’s not being causally screened off (the Pen and Teller example), if
Ppain and Apain are co-present when we make ordinary inductions about
pain, say, it is very unlikely that Apain should be responsible for the
success of all those inductions, with none relying causally on the pres-
ence of Ppain.
This strategy would be particularly persuasive if it were to turn out
that one of the initial lines of evidence is sometimes directly caused by
Kind1 without the mediation of Ap. That possibility is represented by
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dotted arrows on the diagrams above. For example, it may turn out
that Kind1 sometimes directly causes information to be stored in epi-
sodic memory, even when it is not globally available. It might even
turn out that some voluntary verbal reports of the information that p
are made without that information being globally available (although
presumably it would become available shortly afterwards, if the subject
listens to their own report). If S evinces one of the initial lines of evi-
dence due to instantiating Ap then she should, barring some interfering
factor, evince all the others too. However if the storing of a particular
episodic memory, say, were due only to instantiating Kind1, without
Ap, then she would not show the other signs (verbal report, etc.) at the
time, despite the other consuming systems being unimpaired. Some of
the inferences between memory storage and the other lines of evidence
would then depend causally on Kind1.
If that is how things turn out, then it would be reasonably clear that
our concept of Pp would refer to Kind1, since even inferences amongst
our initial standard means of identiﬁcation depend on it. That is not
the only way we could be convinced that Kind1 = Pp — the general
considerations about what underpins our inductive practices do not
rely on it — but it would convince those whose semantic theory gives
special weight to the initial means of identiﬁcation.
6.2 Working with a partly ﬁrst-personal, partly third-personal concept
The story is not substantially different if our concept of Pp is partly
ﬁrst-personal and partly third-personal. That is to say, as well as track-
ing phenomenality through our initial lines of evidence and other third-
personal tests Ti, we also identify instances of Pp in ourselves in an
unmediated way, tokening of the concept being caused directly by
instantiation of the property in the same subject.
Provided the ﬁrst-personal modes of application have no special sta-
tus, then they would just be further means of identifying instances of
Pp (ones that the subject can only use on herself). Some inferences
would depend upon third-personal ways of identifying Pp, some on
ﬁrst-personal identiﬁcation, and some would go from one to the other.
Our argument that the concept refers to the property or properties that
underpin those inductive practices still applies. If Kind1 and Kind2
come and go together, then it is very likely that Kind1 will causally
underpin the success of some of those inferences. Even if all the ﬁrst-
personal identiﬁcations of Pp depended on Ap ⁄ Kind2, if ﬁrst-personal
uses are just further means of identiﬁcation, on a par with the third-
personal, the fact that some of the inductions rely on third-personal
means of identiﬁcation would be enough to ensure that Kind1 was
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needed to underpin the success of those inferences. So the concept of
Pp would end up referring to Kind1.
In short, if the ﬁrst-personal and third-personal ways of picking out
Pp have equal standing, and application of the natural kind methodol-
ogy uncovers two natural kinds underpinning our practices of making
inductions over the cases so-identiﬁed, then we would have reason for
thinking that Kind1 is the referent of our concept of Pp.
6.3 Working with a Primarily First-Personal Concept
Things look different if the ﬁrst-person mode of application is primary.
Here we can imagine a sceptic who says, ‘I don’t care what natural
kind is picked out by our ordinary third-personal ways of identifying
phenomenality (verbal report and the like), what I want to know is
whether instantiating property X would feel like this’ — where the sub-
ject is herself instantiating the property of being phenomenally con-
scious that p. That is to take the ﬁrst-personal mode of application as
privileged — to think of Pp as picked out by what is sometimes called
a phenomenal concept.
A ﬁrst answer is that the ordinary concept of phenomenality does
not work like that, nor should it. That answer is fully adequate, but it
is instructive to see that, even if the sceptic is taken on his own terms,
the natural kind methodology has more to offer.
The question is: what would be the reference of a purely ﬁrst-
personal phenomenal concept, which one applies to oneself directly in
virtue of instantiating the experience Pp, and only then? Would such a
concept refer to Kind1, the natural kind we have discovered in addition
to Ap? Inductions made about other people must be set aside. Consid-
erations about the inductions one makes in one’s own case over one’s
own instantiation of Pp are now all that is relevant. It might be that, in
respect of these inductions too, we would discern cases that rely on
Kind1 as well as those that rely on Ap. This subsection suggests the
way further evidence about that can be gathered.
First we need to characterise ﬁrst-person applications of the con-
cept in more detail. What seems to happen when a subject acquires
a phenomenal concept of the subjective character of one of her own
experiences, is that she forms a disposition to classify together epi-
sodes of her experience in virtue of similarity in their phenomenal
character (Loar 1990, Papineau 2002). If the episodes which she is
disposed to classify together do indeed share some real property,
then her phenomenal concept will succeed in referring — it will refer
to that common property. The phenomenal property, though, is inde-
pendent of her applications of the phenomenal concept. Indeed, it
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seems that subjects instantiate phenomenal properties of which they
have never formed a phenomenal concept (quantifying over experi-
ences in general — of course, if the subject starts thinking about any
one such phenomenal property, she will somehow have formed a
concept of it).7 Even when the subject does possess a phenomenal
concept of a given phenomenal property she can have one of those
experiences without applying the concept to it; and when she does
apply the concept to it, application of the concept usually follows
from (comes after) her instantiation of the phenomenal property to
which it refers.
This bit of reﬂection makes plausible the claim that instantiation of
the phenomenal property being phenomenally conscious that p is inde-
pendent of, and typically causally antecedent to, ﬁrst-person applica-
tion of the concept being phenomenally conscious that p directly to
oneself in virtue of having that experience. That is the extra bit of data
that will help to address the semantic issue. Notice its modesty. The
claim is not that we can introspect that there is phenomenality without
access. Let us allow that phenomenal concept application is sufﬁcient
for Ap: exercise of the concept being phenomenally conscious that p
makes the information that p8 globally available for use in directing a
range of behaviours (or requires that the information that p be so
available).9
We make no such supposition about the property being phenome-
nally conscious that p. We are leaving open whether it is dependent on
or independent of Ap. As far as this line of argument goes, the prop-
erty being phenomenally conscious that p may or may not always be co-
instantiated with Ap. If it is so connected, it remains separate from the
property of exercising the concept being phenomenally conscious that p.
Of course, we’ll need some lines of evidence that a subject is exercising
the concept being phenomenally conscious that p. A lot is known about
the cognitive psychology of concepts, and about the neural basis of the
exercise of concepts. Gathering and applying such data presents no
special methodological obstacles. So it is perfectly reasonable to
7 This does not rule out a species of representationalism according to which phenome-
nal experience has conceptual content; it just says that we can have such experiences
without applying phenomenal concepts to them (phenomenal concepts are concepts
of the experience).
8 Most obviously, it should make globally available the meta-level information that S
is phenomenally conscious that p. But we can concede that global availability of the
object-level information is a likely concomitant.
9 If not, we would be in even better shape methodologically, because we could then
discern diﬀerences between three properties of S: Ap(S), S’s exercise of the concept
being phenomenally conscious that p, and S’s instantiation of the property of being
phenomenally conscious that p.
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suppose that we will be able to formulate good empirical tests for
whether a subject is exercising the concept being phenomenally conscious
that p, and that these will be independent of the battery of tests Ti by
which we tell that a subject is phenomenally conscious that p.
To carry forward the enquiry from there, we would have to dis-
cover more about the nature of the property to which ﬁrst-person
uses of the concept are applied. Is its application directly triggered by
Kind1, or is its application instead always mediated by Ap? We will
not speculate here about how that enquiry is likely to go. A more
limited point is sufﬁcient for our purposes, given our concern with
potential methodological obstacles. If our introspective take on appli-
cations of the phenomenal concept is correct, then science should be
able to distinguish between exercise of the concept and instantiation
of the property to which it is applied. Those latter are the instances
about which we need to ask. If they fall in the Ap cluster then we
will have abductive evidence that Pp and Ap are nomologically co-
instantiated, with Kind1 a pre-phenomenal property in the vicinity.
On the other hand, if Kind1 is typically the direct causal antecedent
to ﬁrst-person exercise of the concept being phenomenally conscious
that p, and people sometimes instantiate Kind1 without thereby
instantiating property Ap, then we will have abductive evidence that a
purely ﬁrst-personal phenomenal concept of being phenomenally con-
scious that p (if there were such a concept) would refer to Kind1,
which is independent of Ap.
This investigation can succeed even though, as we have conceded,
phenomenal concept application is sufﬁcient for Ap (things are only
easier if not). However, the method does depend on phenomenal con-
cept application not being necessary for Ap. If it were, phenomenal
concept application and Ap would always go together, making it
impossible for empirical methods to tell them apart. However, the
argument we made above about phenomenal concept application not
being necessary for Pp also shows that it is implausible that phenome-
nal concept application is necessary for Ap. A subject can have an
experience of p and make the information that p globally available (i.e.
instantiate Pp and Ap) without having a phenomenal concept of that
experience at all. The content of Ap may just concern the world, as
may the content of Pp (if it has a content), whereas the content of the
phenomenal concept concerns the thinker’s own psychological states. It
is not plausible that having such meta-level concepts is necessary
for object-level contents to be globally available (Ap). Even where the
subject happens to have a phenomenal concept of Pp, tokening of
that meta-level concept is not plausibly required for the object-level
information that p to be made globally available.
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7. Conclusion: a Methodology that will Encounter the Phenomenal Kind
If we think consciousness really could be a natural phenomenon, then
we ought to be open to moving beyond our initial means of identifying
instances of it. This paper has set out a systematic method for doing
so.
Studying phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind presents
no special obstacle unless it turns out that our ordinary ways of
identifying Pp depend causally on a mechanism for the global
availability of information Ap. If we discover no such mechanism,
then that is a very straightforward route to the existence of P with-
out A.
Such an easy resolution seems unlikely because there is good evi-
dence for the existence of an Ap mechanism (a global workspace).
The method we then suggest is to perform a systematic search for
the natural kind or kinds underlying the successful inductions that
can be made about people who are phenomenally conscious. If we
ﬁnd only the Ap mechanism, and no second natural kind underlying
those inductions, then that is strong evidence that Pp is always co-
instantiated with Ap. The systematic scientiﬁc study of consciousness
has only just begun, but on the current and very partial state of the
evidence that outcome looks to be worth a bet. What makes our
approach signiﬁcant is that it shows that the co-extensiveness of A
and P can be something we discover empirically, rather than
something that is built into the assumptions we bring to the
enquiry.
Although it currently looks less likely, it could turn out that there
are two natural kinds underlying the successful inductions involving Pp,
kinds which normally come along together because Kind1 causes
Kind2, but which come apart in some actual cases. We have argued
that this would give us evidence that Pp and Ap come apart in such
cases since, on plausible assumptions, our concept of Pp would refer to
Kind1 and Ap to Kind2.
One of the assumptions was that our concept of Pp is sometimes
deployed using third-personal modes of application, and that any ﬁrst-
personal modes of application are in no way privileged. We think that
assumption is correct, so the argument could end there. But we have
gone on to show that, even if not, distinguishing phenomenal concept
application from Pp and Ap would still give us a way of resolving the
issue empirically.
If there do turn out to be two underlying natural kinds, then con-
sciousness will fractionate in a way that goes against commonsense
intuition. We could ﬁnd subjects who are phenomenally conscious that
p but without the information that p being globally available. The
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subject would show evidence of Pp in some but not all types of behav-
iour. For example, the information might be unavailable to verbal
report. It seems odd that we could conclude that a person who reports
not having an experience that p is nevertheless phenomenally conscious
that p. But these would necessarily be odd cases, since the subject
would evince the information that p in some modes of behaviour. The
arguments in this paper show that, if we remain open to the possibility
that phenomenal consciousness is a natural kind, scientiﬁc discoveries
about it could give us good reason to revise our commonsense intu-
itions about such cases.
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Appendix
The following distribution of degrees of belief is coherent:
In particular, the distribution of P in the A and A regions required
by (1a) and (1b) does not, on its own, constrain the distribution of P in
the {T&A} and {T&A} regions. That can be shown by the existence
proof below, by assigning some values, but is perhaps most readily
appreciated from a diagram: [Fig. 6]
Initial evidence: Pr(P|A) high Pr(P|A) high
equivalently: (1a) Pr(P|A) low (1b) Pr(P|A) low
Further test: (2a) Pr(P|T) high (2b) Pr(P|T) high
Trumping: (3a) Pr(P|{T&A}) high (3b) Pr(P|{T&A}) high
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